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CRIMINAL LAW-CONFUSION IN THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY-THE DOCTRINE OF DIMINISHED CAPACITY AND 
THE USE OF MENTAL IMPAIRMENT TO REDU.CE DEGREE OF 
CONVICTION IN MASSACHUSETTs--Commonwealth v. Gould, 1980 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1253, 405 N.E.2d 927. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Facts 
Commonwealth v. Gould! involved a defendant with a long 
history of severe mental illness2 who brutally murdered3 a former 
girlfriend. 4 Defendant was charged with murder under Massachu­
setts' first degree murder statute. 5 Three separate types of murder 
are incorporated into the statute. Gould was accused of two types: 
"Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice afore­
thought"6 and murder committed "with extreme atrocity or cru­
1. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1253,405 N.E.2d 927. 
2. The defendant, Dennis Gould, was treated for mental illness from 1973 until 
the time of the murder, July 17, 1978. Id. at 1256, 405 N.E.2d at 929. During this 
time he was hospitalized for several periods, including a period beginning in April 
1975, when he intentionally amputated his right arm by placing it under the wheels 
of a moving trolley car. Id. at 1257 n.6, 405 N.E.2d at 929 n.6. Gould, believing that 
he was the new Messiah, suffered from religious delusions. He believed that God 
had directed him to kill the victim because she was "impure." Id. at 1257, 405 
N.E.2d at 929. When arrested, Gould expressed the opinion that he would not be im­
prisoned for his deed, but rather that he would be sent to Israel and crucified. Id. at 
1256, 405 N .E.2d at 929. 
3. The evidence shows that the defendant furtively waited for the victim outside 
her place of employment. As the victim walked toward the building, the defendant 
followed her and attacked her with a knife. Id. at 1254, 405 N.E.2d at 928. A 
passerby interceded, restrained the defendant, and then left to seek help for the vic­
tim. When he returned, the defendant was again stabbing the victim. Id. at 1254, 405 
N.E.2d at 928. Death was determined to have been caused by a massive hemorrhage 
resulting from 31 stab wounds. Id. at 1255 n.2, 405 N.E.2d at 928 n.2. 
4. The victim and the defendant had dated each other regularly for a few 
months in 1973. She broke off the relationship when Gould threatened her with a 
knife after being overcome by delusions. Id at 1256 n.4, 405 N.E.2d at 929 n.4. 
5. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1970) defines murder: 
[mlurder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commis­
sion of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in 
the first degree. Murder which does not appear to be in the first degree is 
murder in the second degree. 
6. This category is referred to as deliberately premeditated murder. Conviction 
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elty."7 The third type, murder occurring during the "commission 
or attempted commission" of a capital crime,8 was irrelevant to the 
case. 
The only defense offered was lack of criminal responsibility9 
due to Gould's insanity.1o Conflicting expert testimony as to 
Gould's sanity was presented at trial by the Commonwealth and by 
the defense.ll Could then moved for a directed verdict of not 
guilty as to so much of the indictment as charged him with first de­
gree murder.12 Could argued that his mental illness precluded him 
from formulating the specific intent necessary for conViction of first 
degree murder.13 Could alternatively argued that the causal rela­
tion between his mental illness and the crime warranted a directed 
verdict of not guilty on the first degree murder charge. 14 The 
for this type of murder in the first degree requires proof of a specific intent to kill or 
to do serious bodily harm which results in death. See Commonwealth v. Tucker, 189 
Mass. 457, 486-96, 76 N.E. 127, 138-42 (1905), for an exhaustive discussion of this 
category of first degree murder. 
7. This category of first degree murder is fairly unique to the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts for it has never been interpreted to include a specific intent ele~ 
ment. Other jurisdictions, such as California, have statutes which are somewhat simi­
lar but whose main difference lies in the requirement of a specific intent to torture. 
See CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (Deering 1970). Conviction for murder in the -first degree, 
in the absence of specific intent, had been explained in the Commonwealth as a jus­
tifiable reaction to an excessively shocking manner of producing death. See 1980 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1274-75, 405 N.E.2d at 938-39 (Quirico, J., concurring in part & 
dissenting in part). For an in-depth discussion of murder with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty, see notes 65-71 & 126-157 infra and accompanying text. 
8. This category is termed "felony murder." See J. NOLAN, 32 MASS. PRAC. § 
179 (1976). 
9. A person is "criminally responsible" when his mental state is such that he 
can be held accountable under the criminal laws for his wrongful actions. See R. 
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 738-40 (1957). 
10. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1258, 405 N.E.2d at 930. 
11. Dennis Gould was diagnosed by the expert for the Commonwealth as being 
afflicted with "paranoid psychosis." Id. at 1257, 405 N.E.2d at 930. The expert did 
not consider Gould's mental impairment to be "substantial." He testified that not 
only did Gould know that his acts were illegal when he committed them, but that 
Gould was not acting under an irresistible impulse and could have stopped his own 
actions.ld. at 1257-58,405 N.E.2d at 930. 
Two experts for the defense diagnosed Gould as a "paranoid schizophrenic" 
who clearly lacked responsibility. Id. at 1258,405 N.E.2d at 930. One expert testified 
that Gould was no longer able to consider the impact of his actions rationally or to 
restrain violent urges. ld. at 1259,405 N.E.2d at 930-31. The other expert believed 
the murder to be a direct result of Gould's delusion that he was on a divine mission. 
Id. at 1259,405 N.E.2d at 931. 
12. ld. at 1259,405 N.E.2d at 931. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. at 1259-60,405 N.E.2d at 931. 
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motion was denied,15 and a jury convicted Gould of first degree 
murder.1s 
Gould appealed the verdict on two theories. First, he claimed 
that the trial court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict as to 
first degree murder constituted reversible error.17 The Massachu­
setts Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention, holding that 
a directed verdict would have been an "unwarranted invasion of 
the province of the jury"18 for it is the duty of the jury to find the 
facts, "including those facts or issues on which they hear psychiat­
ric testimony. "19 
Gould also appealed pursuant to chapter 278, section 33E of 
the Massachusetts General Laws,20 a "safety valve"21 provision that 
provides for a general review of all capital cases by the supreme ju­
dicial court. 22 It was under the rubric of this general review provi­
sion that the supreme judicial court wrestled with the problems 
presented by Gould. The court grappled with the conflicts between 
such notions as defendant's impaired mental condition and that im­
pairment's effect on the specific intent requirement of deliberately 
premeditated murder, and the relevance of defendant's state of 
mind in relation to murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty, which 
traditionally lacked a specific intent element. 23 
In an ambiguo1.ls opinion the court attempted to define the ef­
15. [d. 
16. [d. at 1253,405 N.E.2d at 927. 
17. [d. at 1259,405 N.E.2d at 931. 
18. [d. at 1260,405 N.E.2d at 931. 
19. [d. 
20. The relevant statutory provision states: 
[i]n a capital case as herein defined the entry [of trial transcripts] in the su­
preme judicial court shall transfer to that court the whole case for its consid­
eration of the law and the evidence. Upon such consideration the court may, 
if satisfied that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, or be­
cause of newly discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice 
may require (a) order a new trial or (b) direct the entry of a verdict of a 
lesser degree of guilr,1fud remand the case to the superior court for imposi­
tion of sentence. For the purpose of such review a capital case shall mean a 
case in which the defendant was tried on an indictment for murder in the 
first degree and was convi~ted of murder in the first or second degree .... 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 33E (West 1962) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
referred to as § 33E]. 
21. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1260, 405 N.E.2d at 931 (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2266, 2282, 380 N.E.2d 113, 120). 
22. See note 19 supra. 
23. For an analysis of Gould and its implications, see ~otes 91-157 infra and ac­
companying text. 
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fect of a defendant's mental impairment on the necessary elements 
of both deliberately premeditated murder and murder with ex­
treme atrocity or cruelty. The supreme judicial court then re­
manded the case for a new trial. 24 In so doing the supreme judicial 
court may have effected major changes in the Commonwealth's 
law, for the court has, in effect, recognized the doctrine of dimin­
ished capacity, a defense which reduces a defendant's criminal cul­
pability and thus his degree of conviction. 25 The decision also 
modifies the established law of murder by extreme atrocity or cru­
elty either by adding a specific intent element or by fashioning an 
entirely new defense for the crime based on a nebulous standard of 
"E: .rumess. "26 
To understand the implications of Gould it is first necessary to 
become familiar with the doctrine of diminished capacity and its 
relation to prior Massachusetts law. 
B. 	 Doctrine of Diminished Capacity 
Black's Law Dictionary27 defines "diminished responsibility 
doctrine" as "[a] misnomer for doctrine under which proof of men­
tal derangement short of insanity is submitted as evidence of lack 
of deliberate or premeditated design. "28 Also known as the doc­
trine of diminished capacity, the concept allows a defendant the 
opportunity to produce evidence which tends to negate a specific 
mens rea requirement and thus to disprove a necessary element of 
the crime. 29 The specific intent element of a crime may be negated 
by a showing that an impairment of the defendant's mental capac­
ity, induced by disease, defect, or sometimes intoxication, so be­
24. 	 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1267, 405 N.E.2d at 935. 
25. For a discussion of Gould's effect on the law of deliberately premeditated 
murder, see notes 91-125 infra and accompanying text. 
26. Gould's effect on murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty is discussed in 
notes 125-57 infra and accompanying text. 
27. 	 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (4th rev. ed. 1968). 
28. 	 ld. at 545. 
29. See, e.g., People v. Mosher, 1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 
(1969) (citing People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 318, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815,411 P.2d 911 
(1966)). In Mosher, a despondent and intoxicated defendant beat a woman to death. 
The California Supreme Court held that "when evidence of diminished capacity has 
been introduced, the jury must be instructed that if it finds the defendant could not 
harbor malice aforethought because of mental disease, defect, or intoxication the 
homicide cannot be an offense higher than manslaughter." ld. at 385, 461 P.2d at 
662, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 382. The court recognized that "a proper factual showing of di­
minished capacity" may negate the specific intent requisite for robbery, burglary, or 
rape. ld. at 392, 461 P.2d at 667, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 387. 
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fuddled the actor that he could not form the specific intent to com­
mit a particularly defined crime: rather, the actor could only 
formulate a general intent to do some wrong that was then mani­
fested by his particular act. 30 
Jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine31 generally have 
structured it along one of two lines. 32 The United States v. 
Brawner33 approach, followed by Califomia34 and formerly by the 
District of Columbia,35 allows a defendant to produce evidence of 
his inability to formulate specific intent in all crimes having a de­
fined mens rea element. 36 Other jUrisdictions, however, limit the 
doctrine by applying it only to crimes that involve specific intent 
and which provide multiple degrees of conviction, such as homi­
. cide. 37 Several jurisdictions have simply rejected the doctrine. 38 
C. History of Diminished Capacity Doctrine in Massachusetts 
Massachusetts, in effect, had rejected the doctrine of dimin­
ished capacity as early as 1914 in Comrrwnwealth v. Cooper. 39 
30. For example, assume that D, a mentally retarded person, is unintentionally 
slighted by V. D's reaction is to wait outside V's home. When V arrives, D fatally 
stabs V to teach V to "be nice." Although an objective survey of the facts tends to 
show deliberate premeditation as evidenced by D's "lying in wait" for V with a 
knife, D may negate this showing of deliberate premeditation by proving, for in­
stance, that he does not understand the concept of death. D then may be convicted 
of a lesser crime, such as second degree murder or manslaughter, because he in­
tended his actions and those actions produced V's death. Since D was incapable of 
understanding that death is not a reversible condition, however, a conviction of mur­
der in the first degree would not be permitted because D was incapable of harboring 
a specific intent to kill V. 
31. See G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE 
REFORM 97-126 (1975); Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases For Purposes 
Other Than the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051 (1975). 
32. See Comment, Diminished Capacity-Recent Decisions and an Analytical 
Approach, 30 VAND. L. REV. 213 (1977). 
33. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
34. See People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949); People v. Mosher, 
1 Cal. 3d 379, 461 P.2d 659, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1969); People v. Taylor, 220 Cal. App. 
2d 212, 33 Cal. Rptr. 654 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963). 
35. 471 F.2d at 969 (rejected by the court in Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 
64 (D.C. 1976)). 
36. See 471 F.2d at 1002; Comment, supra note 31, at 215-17. 
37. Comment, supra note 32, at 217-19. 
38. Some confusion exists as to exactly which states have rejected the doctrine. 
Compare G. MORRIS, supra note 31, at 97-126 with Lewin, note 31, at 1105-15 and 
Comment, supra note 32, at 222-23 n.46. 
39. 219 Mass. 1, 106 N.E. 545 (1914). Cooper shot his lover's paramour three 
times in the back. His defense was that he was suffering from a mental disorder, 
which he termed a "constitutional inferiority" that "carries with it a limited, that is, a 
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There the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court flatly stated that, 
"If found to be irresponsible the defendant was entitled to a ver­
dict of not guilty by reason of insanity; but his irresponsibility 
would not reduce the degree of crime. "40 More than fifty years 
later the court echoed this rationale by holding that a defendant's 
claim that he was "incapable of deliberate premeditation because of 
mental disease . . . must fail since such a defense is not recognized 
in this jurisdiction. "41 
The supreme judicial court also applied that same rule to cases 
involving mental retardation and organic, rather than psychotic, 
disorders. In Commonwealth v. Mazza,42 a mentally handicapped 
person was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal defendant 
urged the court to recognize the defense of diininished capacity. 
based on mental retardation, as opposed to mental illness, through 
the discretionary powers granted by section 33E.43 The court 
dismissed the appeal, adhering to the view "that there is no inter­
mediate stage of partial criminal responsibility between insanity and 
ordinary responsibility as defined by statute."44 
The supreme judicial court, however, has allowed the some­
what related partial defense of intoxication to negate the specific 
intent element of murder committed with deliberately premedi­
tated malice aforethought. 45 This defense, though, has been lim­
diminished degree of responsibility for the act." Id. at 4, 106 N.E. at 547. This con­
tention was rejected by the court. Id. 
40. Id. at 5, 106 N.E. at 547 (emphasis added). 
41. Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 541, 547, 350 N.E.2d 460, 465 (1976). 
But see Commonwealth v. Cadwell, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 372 N.E.2d 246, in 
which the court reduced a verdict of murder in the first degree to murder in the sec­
ond degree in a case discussing the psychological and sociological features of the 
"battered child syndrome"; Comment, Commonwealth v. Cadwell: Deliberate Pre­
meditation, Extreme Atrocity and Cruelty, and the Battered Child Syndrome-A 
New Look At Criminal Culpability in Massachusetts, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 812 
(1979). 
42. 366 Mass. 30, 313 N.E.2d 875 (1974). The defendant had an I.Q. of 77, was 
unable to understand material beyond the second-grade level, and was a functional 
illiterate. Id. at 32, 313 N.E.2d at 877. 
43. See note 20 supra for the relevant provisions of § 33E. 
44. 366 Mass. at 33,313 N.E.2d at 878. 
45. See Commonwealth v. Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. 615, 84 N.E.2d 7 (1949), in 
which the defendant claimed to have become extremely drunk at a wedding. The ev­
idence showed that he lured a seven-year-old girl into a parking lot and attempted to 
rape her. When she screamed, he crushed her skull with a rock. Defendant later con­
fessed and was convicted of murder in the first degree. On appeal he unsuccessfully 
argued that the trial judge erred in not giving the jury an instruction that intoxication 
is a mitigating factor of felony murder. The trial judge, however, instructed the jury 
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ited to use against deliberately premeditated first degree murder: 
it has not been applied to felony-murder or first degree murder 
involving extreme atrocity or cruelty.46 The court has always been 
careful to distinguish the partial defense of intoxication from any 
notion of diminished capacity based upon mental disease or defect 
by holding that insanity, if found, is a complete defense; whereas 
intoxication may not completely exonerate the intoxicated actor. 47 
The court has justified this distinction by characterizing the intoxi­
cation defense as "merely an application of the ordinary rules of 
law pertaining to the requisite mental state for conviction of a par­
ticular crime charged. "48 Thus, the supreme judicial court seems to 
view the intoxication defense as an internal device inherent in the 
definition of deliberately premeditated murder and other specific 
mens rea crimes. On the other hand, the court views the insanity 
defense as an external device which may be imposed as a bar to 
conviction of any crime. 
D. The Massachusetts Insanity Rule-MeHoul 
In the absence of the doctrine of diminished capacity, the is­
sue of a mentally handicapped defendant's criminal responsibility 
had been determined in Massachusetts through the application of 
the two-pronged test of Commonwealth v. McHoul. 49 Under the 
McHoul test, a person is not criminally responsible if his mental 
condition renders him incapable of appreciating the difference be­
tween right and wrong or, even if he retains the capacity to distin­
guish between right and wrong, his condition renders him unable 
to control his actions. 50 This test has not been interpreted to allow 
that intoxication could be used to negate the specific intent element of deliberately 
premeditated first degree murder. The instruction was upheld by the supreme judi­
cial court. [d. at 617-18, 84 N.E.2d at 8-9. See note 124 infra for the instruction given 
in Delle Chiaie. 
46. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 374 Mass. 453, 373 N.E.2d 1121 
(1978). In this felony-murder case, the defendant urged the use of § 33E to establish 
a defense of diminished capacity based upon voluntary intoxication along the lines of 
the liberal California rule. See note 29 supra for a discussion of th~ California rule. 
The supreme judicial court rejected this plea and refused to extend the defense of 
intoxication to felony murder. [d. at 460-65,373 N.E.2d at 1125-27. 
47. See, e.g., 374 Mass. 453, 462-64, 373 N.E.2d 1121, 1125-27 (1978); 366 
Mass. at 34, 313 N.E.2d at 878. 
48. 366 Mass. at 34, 313 N.E.2d at 878. 
49. 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967). The second part of this test is known 
as the "irresistible impulse" rule. [d. at 546, 226 N.E.2d at 557. 
50. [d. at 546, 226 N .E.2d at 557. 
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mental impairment to negate a specific mens rea element of a par­
ticular crime charged. 51 
The court in McHoul, however, did state that this two­
pronged test is basically the same rule as the one embodied in sec­
tion 4.01 of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code:52 "we 
regard the [Model Penal] Code definition as an evolutionary re­
statement of our rule . . . . "53 The Model Penal Code states that 
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of 
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub­
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. "54 
McHoul and subsequent Massachusetts decisions came to 
stand for the proposition that an insanity defense, if accepted by 
the jury, would exonerate the defendant entirely; but it could not 
reduce his degree of conviction. 55 Thirteen years after McHoul, a 
reconstituted court56 rejected McHoul's basic premis&-that insan­
ity is an all-or-nothing defense. 
E. Gould-The Decision 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Abrams, focused on 
two issues: Whether Gould's mental capacity rendered him unable 
to deliberately premeditate57 and whether Gould's mental capacity 
should be considered in determining whether the murder was 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. While finding the trial 
record free from error, the supreme judicial court sustained 
Gould's appeal under the general supervisory powers of section 
33E and ordered a new trial. 58 At the new trial, in addition to hav­
51. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 541,350 N.E.2d 460 (1976), in 
which the defendant argued that psychiatric testimony "should be admissible in or­
der to prove that the defendant was incapable of deliberate premeditation because of 
mental disease." [d. at 547, 350 N.E.2d at 465. The court concluded, "His claim 
must fail since such a defense is not recognized in this jurisdiction." [d. 
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
53. 352 Mass. at 547, 226 N .E.2d at 558. 
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, at 66 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
55. The stated purpose of the McHoul test is to foreclose any possibility of 
criminal sanctions being imposed upon mentally handicapped defendants. 352 Mass. 
at 552, 226 N.E.2d at 561. This intent precludes the doctrine of diminished capacity 
which does impose criminal sanctions, to a lesser degree, upon such mentally 
handicapped defendants. 
56. The justices who decided McHoul were: Wilkins, C.J., Whittemore, Cutter, 
Spiegel, and Reardon, JJ. The justices on the Gould court included: Hennessey, C.J., 
Quirico, Braucher, Kaplan, Wilkens, Liacos, and Abrams, JJ. 
57. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1254,405 N.E.2d at 928. 
58. [d. at 1261,405 N.E.2d at 932. All justices agreed to order a new trial, but 
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ing psychiatric testimony applied to the issues of whether defend­
ant was able to distinguish between right and wrong and whether 
he was acting under an irresistible impulse, Gould will be per­
mitted to "produce expert testimony on the issue of whether or not 
the impairment of his mental processes precluded him from being 
able to deliberately premeditate. "59 
In holding that a jury should consider a defendant's mental ill­
ness to determine whether he possessed the mental capacity neces­
sary to deliberately premeditate, the court analogized Gould to 
cases involving use of the partial defense of intoxication. 6o The 
court reasoned that it would be incongruous to allow the jury to 
consider the effect of mental impairment when the defendant has 
voluntarily impaired his mental awareness, thus making him unable 
to deliberately premeditate murder, but to prevent the jury from 
considering mental capacity in cases involving an involuntary im­
pairment resulting from mental illness. 61 The court flatly rejected 
the argument that a defendant's mental illness should be used 
solely to prove lack of criminal responsibility and not to disprove 
specific intent. 62 The court overruled all prior Massachusetts deci­
sions which interpreted McHoul63 as precluding consideration of 
mental illness to negate specific intent. 64 
The court further held that henceforth juries should "also con­
sider the defendant's mental impairment on the issue of whether 
he committed the murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty. "65 This' 
is an odd holding since Comrrwnwealth v. Gilbert,66 cited as sup­
port in Gould, and all subsequent Massachusetts decisions67 have 
held that the crime of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty 
does not include a specific mens rea element which may be 
negated by mental illness. The issue presented in Commonwealth 
Justice Quirico, joined by Chief Justice Hennessey, disagreed with the majority's ra­
tionale. Id. at 1268,405 N.E.2d at 935 (Quirico, J., concurring in part & dissenting in 
part). 
59. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1254,405 N.E.2d at 928. 
60. Id. at 1261-62, 405 N.E.2d at 932. For a discussion of the intoxication de­
fense, see notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text. 
61. Id. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932. 
62. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263,405 N.E.2d at 933. 
63. See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra for a discussion of McHoul. 
64. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263,405 N.E.2d at 933. 
65. Id. at 1254,405 N.E.2d at 928. 
66. 165 Mass. 45, 42 N.E. 336 (1895) (cited as support in Commonwealth v. 
Gould, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265,405 N.E.2d at 934). 
67. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 378 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977); 
Commonwealth v. Lacy, 371 Mass. 363,358 N.E.2d 419 (1976). 
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v. Gilbert68 was whether "knowledge that the act of killing was at~ 
tended with extreme atrocity or cruelty" was required for convic­
tion. 69 The court answered in the negative: 
We do not think this special knowledge of the character of 
the act is an element which enters into the statutory description 
of a murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. The in­
telligence and mental capacity requisite for the commission of 
murder were found 'to exist. Knowledge that the crime was ex­
tremely atrocious or cruel is not required. If the prisoner was a 
responsible agent, the statute providing that murder committed 
with extre~e atrocity or cruelty is murder in the first degree 
calls for no greater degree of knowledge than is required for a 
conviction of murder in the second degree. 70 
Although specific intent need not be shown, certain factors 
may be considered in a particular case to determine whether a 
murder was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. Relevant 
factors include the victim's consciousness and degree of suffering, 
the extent of physical injury, the method employed to inflict death, 
indifference to the victim's pain, and the disproportion between 
the means actually used and the means capable of inflicting 
death. 71 
The Gould court stressed that in some cases the defendant's 
pleasure in the torture or destruction of his victim is relevant to 
the issue of whether a murder was committed with extreme atroc­
ity or cruelty. 72 The court ignored the fact that extreme atrocity or 
cruelty cases reject the need for such a sadistic frame of mind. 73 
68. 165 Mass. at 45,42 N.E. at 336. 
69. Id. at 58, 42 N.E. at 338. 
70. Id. at 58-59, 42 N.E. at 338 (emphasis added). See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
1274, 405 N.E.2d at 938 (Quirico, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Use 
of the phrase "responsible agent" also connotes the all-or-nothing application of an 
insanity defense. 
71. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Golston, 378 Mass. 249, 260, 366 N.E.2d 744, 
752 (1977); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 356 Mass. 617, 628, 255 N.E.2d 191, 198 
(1970). 
72. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265, 405 N.E.2d at 934. 
73. The court cited Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 
(1977), as support for this proposition. In that case an 18-year-old black defendant 
snuck up behind a 34-year-old white man who was walking toward his car and 
crushed his skull with one blow from a baseball bat. The defendant stated that he 
did it "for kicks." Defendant objected to the submission to the jury of th~ issue of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty. Id. at 260, 366 N.E.2d at 752. The court stressed the tra­
ditional factor of indifference to the victim's suffering but never implied a "malicious 
. mind" requirement. On the contrary, the court felt that "there is no requirement that 
the defendant know that his act was extremely atrocious or cruel, and no require­
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The supreme judicial court reasoned that if a "malicious mind" is 
relevant to the issue of extreme atrocity or cruelty "then fairness 
requires that an impaired mind may also be considered. "74 Consid­
eration of an impaired mind was viewed by the court as being "es­
sential" to distinguish "extreme atrocity or cruelty" as a statutory 
definition of first degree murder "from that atrocity or cruelty inev­
itably included in the destruction of any human life."75 The court 
concluded its opinion with a suggested jury instruction on the issue 
of extreme atrocity or cruelty that surprisingly did not mention as a 
relevant factor the defendant's taking pleasure in the destruction of 
his victim. 76 
Justice Quirico, joined by Chief Justice Hennessey, concurred 
in the decision to grant a new trial but disagreed with the majori­
ty's reasoning as to both the deliberate premeditation issue and the 
extreme atrocity or cruelty issue. 77 These justices felt that a new 
trial was necessary on the basis of the simple unspoken premise 
that they believed Gould to be legally insane and thus beyond the 
purview of criminal sanctions. They stated that upon review of all 
the testimony regarding Gould's sanity they could not conclude 
that there was "no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice" 
under the facts of the case. 78 They decided that, although one psy­
chiatrist's testimony supported the verdict of the jury, there may 
have been an error "in the determination of ... [Gould's] mental 
ment of deliberate premeditation." Id. at 260, 366 N.E.2d at 752. Furthermore, the 
court also considered other traditional factors in reaching its decision. ld. at 260, 366 
N.E.2d at 752. 
74. ld. at 1265, 405 N.E.2d at 934. 
75. Id. at 1267, 405 N.E.2d at 935. 
76. Hereafter, in addition to the traditional instructions on extreme atrocity 
or cruelty the judge may also instruct the jurors that if they find from the ev­
idence that the defendant had substantially reduced mental capacity at the 
time the crime was committed, they may consider what effect, if any, the de­
fendant's impaired capacity had on his ability to appreciate the conse­
quences of his choices. Thus, the defendant's mental impairment is to be 
weighed in evaluating the evidence of the manner and means of inflicting 
death, the instrumentalities employed, any disproportion between the means 
actually needed to inflict death and those employed, the consciousness and 
degree of suffering of the victim, and the extent of the victim's physical inju­
ries, factors customarily associated with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
ld. at 1267 n.16, 405 N.E.2d at 935 n.16. But see id. at 1265-66,405 N.E.2d at 934-35, 
in which the court seemed to stress the defendant's indifference to his victim's suf­
fering. 
77. Id. at 1268, 405 N.E.2d at 935 (Quirico, J., concurring in part & dissenting 
in part). 
78. Id. at 1269,405 N.E.2d at 936. 
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competence and criminal responsibility for his acts, "79 for the 
greater weight of all the evidence, including nonpsychiatric testi­
mony, pointed to a holding that Gould was insane at the time of 
his actions. 80 
The majority's rationale analogizing insanity to the defense of 
intoxication was criticized as being a de facto adoption of dimin­
ished capacity, a doctrine defendant expressly argued be adopted. 
As Justice Quirico pointed out, diminished capacity had been re­
jected continually in recent years by the supreme judicial court. 81 
Justice Quirico concluded, however, that the majority's implicit 
recognition of the doctrine of diminished capacity was superfluous 
because the burden of proving deliberate premeditation as an ele­
ment of first degree murder has always been on the Common­
wealth, and when an insanity defense has been raised "that impli­
edly includes the burden of proving that the defendant had the 
capacity to deliberately premeditate the homicide before 
committing it. "82 Once the prosecution has shown the defendant 
not to be insane within the meaning of McHoul, however, the 
prosecution has necessarily shown that the defendant possessed the 
capacity to deliberately premeditate. 83 Justice Quirico noted that 
he believed sufficient evidence existed to properly submit the issue 
of deliberately premeditated first degree murder to the jury. 84 
Justice Quirico's disagreement with the majority as to the ex­
treme atrocity or cruelty issue was even more pronounced. He 
characterized the court's action as "a judicial attempt to rewrite a 
legislative definition of what constitutes one of the three types of 
79. ld. at 1270,405 N.E.2d at 937 (emphasis added). 
80. ld. at 1269,405 N.E.2d at 936. 
81. ld. at 1268,405 N.E.2d at 936. For a brief history of the doctrine of dimin­
ished capacity in Massachusetts, see text accompanying notes 39-48 supra. 
82. ld. at 1269,405 N.E.2d at 936 (Quirico, ]., concurring in part & dissenting 
in part). 
83. Since McHoul established insanity as an all-or-nothing defense, evidence of 
mental impairment should be irrelevant to the issue of deliberate premeditation once 
the prosecution has prevailed on the "insanity" issue. See text accompanying notes 
49-56 supra for a discussion of McHoul. But see text accompanying notes 91-157 in­
fra for an analysis of Gould's effect on McHoul. 
84. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1268, 405 N .E.2d at 935. Justice Quirico thought 
that the evidence was sufficient to submit the issues of deliberate premeditation and 
extreme atrocity and cruelty to the jury but believed that the jury had made the 
wrong decision on the basis of that evidence in not finding Dennis Gould to be in­
sane. For this reason Justice Quirico decided that the case should be remanded for a 
new trial. ld. at 1268, 405 N.E.2d at 935 (Quirico, J., concurring in part & dissenting 
in part). 
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murder in the first degree. "85 He felt that the court was applying 
the doctrine of diminished capacity by allowing the same evidence 
regarding mental impairment that currently may be used to negate 
the specific intent element of deliberately premeditated first de­
gree murder to be employed to reduce a conviction for first degree 
murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty.86 Using evidence which 
may negate specific intent to determine the issue of extreme atroc­
ity or cruelty implies that the crime includes a specific intent ele­
ment. 87 
He noted that such a proposition has been rejected by the 
court since 189588 and that the legislature intended to impose the 
maximum punishment solely upon proof of one fact: That the man­
ner in which death was inflicted was excessively shocking or pain­
ful. 89 In Justice Quirico's view, the cOurt's decision extinguishes 
the difference between the type of murder in the first degree fo­
cusing upon the defendant's specific intent, defined as deliberate 
premeditation, from the type focusing upon the particular means 
used by the defendant to kill, characterized as extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.90 To Justice Quirico, such action should be left to the leg­
islature. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. 	 Effect of Gould on the Law of Deliberately 
Premeditated Murder 
Gould at first appears to be a correct interpretation of the 
McHoul theory that section 4.0l of the Model Penal Code is an 
"evolutionary restatement" of Massachusetts law. 91 In Gould, the 
supreme judicial court held that psychiatric testimony may be of­
fered to negate the specific intent requirement of deliberately pre­
meditated murder just as evidence of intoxication may be offered 
85. 	 [d. at 1273,405 N.E.2d at 938. 
86. 	 [d. at 1271-72,405 N.E.2d at 937. 
87. [d. at 1271, 405 N.E.2d at 937. See notes 130-35 infra and accompanying 
text for an analysis of the implied addition of specific intent into the crime of murder 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
88. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1273-74,405 N.E.2d at 938-39 (Quirico, J., concur­
ring in part & dissenting in part). See Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 165 Mass. at 45, 42 
N .E. at 336, discussed at notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text. 
89. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1275,405 N.E.2d at 939 (Quirico, J., concurring in 
part & dissenting in part). 
90. 	 Id. at 1274,405 N.E.2d at 939. 
91. 	 352 Mass. at 547,226 N.E.2d at 558. 
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to negate specific intent. 92 In support of this position the court 
quoted a passage from United States v. Brawner,93 decided by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 
1972, in which the Model Penal Code rule was adopted and was 
liberally construed. 94 The court probably95 found Brawner's inter­
pretation of the Model Penal Code to be applicable in interpreting 
the McHoul test because the McHoul test assertedly parallels sec­
tion 4.01 of the Model Penal Code. 96 In this way the supreme ju­
dicial court may be viewed as remaining consistent with the 
McHoul rationale in its recent overruling of Massachusetts deci­
sions that interpreted McHoul as rejecting any Brawner-like ap­
proach. 97 Gould also may be considered as a correct interpretation 
of McHoul in that the Gould court categorically.denied that its 
holding adopted the doctrine of diminished capacity,98 a doctrine 
not mentioned in McHoul. 99 
Closer examination, however, reveals that Gould effects a sub­
92.1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932. 
93. Neither logic nor justice can tolerate a jurisprudence that defines the 
elements of an offense as requiring a mental state such that one defendant 
can properly argue that his voluntary drunkenness removed his capacity to 
form the specific intent but another defendant is inhibited from a submis­
sion of his contention that an abnormal mental condition, for which he was 
in no way responsible, negated his capacity to form a specific intent even 
though the condition did not exonerate him from all criminal responsibility. 
ld. at 1262, 405 N.E.2d at 932 (citing United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 999) 
(footnotes omitted). 
94. In Brawner, the court of appeals, sitting en bane, reversed the defendant's 
conviction that had been obtained through the application of the "Durham test" for 
insanity. Under the Durham rule, a person is not responsible for his criminal actions 
if those actions were the product of mental disease or defect. 471 F.2d at 976. The 
court rejected the Durham rule in order to depart from its "product" formulation, 
which had allowed expert witnesses to dominate trials because it required a precise 
medical definition of the defendant's mental condition. ld. at 1011 (Bazelon, C.]., 
concurring in part & dissenting in part). After conducting the exhaustive analysis of 
the use of insanity as a defense, and after considering the alternatives, the court 
adopted the American Law Institute (MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01) insanity test. ld. 
at 973-94. 
95. The court does not clearly explain why it abandoned Massachusetts prece­
dent and embraced the Brawner approach. 
96. 352 Mass. at 547, 226 N.E.2d at 558 (discussed in the text accompanying 
notes 50-52 supra). 
97. Prior Massachusetts cases which rejected the Brawner approach and which 
are now overruled include, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sires, 370 Mass. 541, 350 N.E.2d 
460 (1976); Commonwealth v. Costa, 360 Mass. 177,274 N.E.2d 802 (1971). 
98. "Permitting a jury to consider whether a defendant's mental illness affected 
his capacity to deliberately premeditate is not tantamount to adopting a doctrine of 
diminished responsibility." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932. 
99. See 352 Mass. at 546-55,226 N.E.2d at 557-63. 
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stantial change in Massachusetts law. While disavowing the adop­
tion of diminished capacity, the court held that jurors should 
"consider the defendant's mental illness on the degree of murder 
or on the issue of specific intent. "100 The court's disclaimer not­
withstanding, this is obViously the definition of diminished re­
sponsibility: "Doctrine under which mental derangement short of 
insanity is submitted as evidence of lack of premeditated de­
sign. "101 The court used language that allows mental illness to be 
considered either in relation to the degree of crime or to specific 
intent. This also indicates that the court took the more liberal of 
the two possible approaches to diminished capacity, the Brawner 
approach,102 and rejected the more limited approach of applying 
the doctrine only to crimes involving multiple degrees distin­
guished by specific intent. loa 
Because Gould relies upon and parallels Brawner's rationale, 
the supreme judicial court's statements that it did not adopt dimin­
ished capacity and that it adhered to McHoul must be questioned. 
Following Brawner undermines the court's assertions, for Brawner 
rejected use of the term "diminished capacity," but it did not re­
ject the rationale underlying the doctrine. 104 Indeed, the supreme 
judicial court quoted from a section of Brawner entitled: "Mental 
Condition, though insufficient to exonerate, TrUly be relevant to 
specific mental element of certain crimes or degrees of crime."105 
That section heading is a definition of the doctrine of diminished 
capacity. It is also clearly contrary to the precise intent of the 
100. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263,405 N.E.2d at 933. 
101. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 27, at 545. See note 28 supra and 
accompanying text. 
102. See also notes 31-38 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
two approaches to diminished capacity. 
103. Id. 
104. Our discussion accompanies the redefinition of when a mental condi­
tion exonerates a defendant from criminal responsibility with the doctrine 
that expert testimony as to a defendant's abnormal mental condition may be 
received and considered, as tending to show, in a responsible way, that de­
fendant did not have the specific mental state required for a particular crime 
or degree of crime-even though he was aware that his act was wrongful 
and was able to control it, and hence was not entitled to complete exonera­
tion. 
Some of the cases following this doctrine use the term "diminished respon­
sibility," but we prefer the example of the cases that avoid this term ... for 
its convenience is outweighed by its confusion.... 
471 F.2d at 998 (footnotes omitted). 
105. Id. at 998 (emphasis in original). 
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McHoul test, which is to exonerate those defendants whose mental 
condition has rendered them unable to control their actions and to 
remove them entirely from any possibility of criminal sanctions. lOS 
More importantly, the supreme judicial court may have mis­
placed its trust by adopting the Brawner approach because, as the 
court neglected to mention in its decision, Brawner has been re­
jected in the District of Columbia by Bethea v. United States. 107 
Since Gould relies upon Brawner, some of the criticisms of 
Brawner found in Bethea may be applicable to Gould. Such criti­
cisms include the fact that the Brawner holding was premised 
upon a theory "which may be characterized as logical relevance"108 
for the case held that, if evidence of reduced criminal responsibil­
ity is relevant in cases involving intoxication,109 similar evidence 
logically must be relevant in cases involving mental illness. 110 
Gould parrots this reasoning. 1ll 
Bethea rejected this premise because "The asserted analogy is 
flawed . . . by the fact that there are significant evidentiary distinc­
tions between psychiatric abnormality and the recognized incapac­
itating circumstances, [such as intoxication or epilepsy]. "112 "Ole 
main distinction is that the latter incapacitating conditions may be 
quantified or objectively demonstrated and may be understood by 
lay witnesses and juries, whereas psychiatric testimony as to insan­
ity is often complex and confusing. 1l3 Another distinction cited by 
Bethea that tends to destroy the logic of diminished capacity is the 
106. 352 Mass. at 552, 266 N.E.2d at 561. Moreover, it was further stated that: 
The principle of criminal irresponsibility embodied in the [Massachusetts] 
rule and in the [Model Penal] Code is to maintain the general and specific 
deterrent effect of criminal penalties for wrong conduct, subject only to rec­
ognition of the injustice of punishing those lacking the capacity to appreci­
ate the wrongfulness of, or to control, their behavior. 
Id. at 555, 266 N.E.2d at 563. Thus, the term "capacity" as defined in McHoul refers 
to a defendant's ability to recognize or to control illegal behavior: it is not relevant to 
a defendant's ability to formulate a specific intent or to his degree of culpability. 
107. 365 A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals re­
jected the Brawner rule, holding that cases in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia decided after the District of Columbia Court Reform and 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 11-101 to 11-2504 (1973), 
are not controlling precedent. Id at 70-72. The court further held that the adoption of 
the doctrine in Brawner was mere dictum. Id. at 85. 
108. Id. 
109. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. 615, 84 N.E.2d 7 
(1949), discussed in note 45 supra. 
110. 471 F.2d at 999. See also Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d at 85-86. 
Ill. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932. 
112. 365 A.2d at 88. 
113. Id. at 88. 
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difference between the concept of mens rea, which refers to the 
usually inferred existence of a "guilty mind," from the concept of 
insanity, which "connotes a presumption that a particular individ­
uallacks the capacity to possess such a [guilty] state of mind. "114 
The Bethea court also noted that adoption of diminished ca­
pacity is likely to produce "variable or sliding scales of criminal re­
sponsibility. "115 The court's main objection, though, was to Brawn­
er's reversal of "traditional legal theory"; prior to Brawner the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had al­
ways rejected "any notion of partial insanity."11G 
Prior to Gould, "any notion of partial insanity"117 had been 
rejected by the Massachusetts courts. HS The fact that Gould 
expressly overruled in a summary fashion an entire line of cases 
interpreting and applying McHoul to mean that insanity is a com­
plete defense to criminal charges or no defense at all119 is strong 
testimony that Gould redefines the principles of McHoul. 
From this analysis it may be concluded that despite the court's 
statement to the contrary120 the decision in Gould does, in effect, 
adopt the doctrine of diminished capacity. The doctrine is rooted 
in the court's decision to allow a jury to consider mental impair­
ment in relation to the issue of specific intent, not just to the issue 
of insanity. 
Since the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has followed 
the Brawner approach as to the extent of the doctrine of dimin­
ished capacity, 121 the new rule in Massachusetts appears to be that 
evidence of mental impairment which is occasioned by mental ill­
ness or defect, or by intoxication may be presented to, and consid­
ered by, the jury in order to negate the specific intent element of a 
particular crime. 122 
Justice Quirico's characterization of Gould as representing "no 
114. Id. at 87. 
115. Id. at 88. 
116. Id. at 86. 
117. Id. 
118. See notes 39-48 supra and accompanying text for a brief history of dimin­
ished capacity in the Commonwealth. 
119. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263, 405 N.E.2d at 933. See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Monsen, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309, 385 N.E.2d 984 (1979); Commonwealth v. Lacy, 
371 Mass. 363, 358 N.E.2d 419 (1976); Commonwealth v. Costa, 360 Mass. 177,274 
N.E.2d 802 (1971). 
120. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932. 
12l. See notes 33-36 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the 
Brawner approach. 
122. This rule applies regardless of whether the specific intent crime is defined 
in multiple degrees. Id. 
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great change in our law"123 with respect to the specific intent re­
quirement of deliberately premeditated first degree murder124 may 
be too lenient, for Gould departs drastically from prior case law. 
Gould rejects the premise that insanity, as opposed to intoxication, 
is an all-or-nothing defense, a premise at the foundation of prior 
Massachusetts common law. 125 The rejection of this premise is par­
ticularly clear when considering that part of the decision that deals 
with the issue of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
B. 	 Effect of Gould on Murder with Extreme Atrocity or Cruelty 
In Gould the court held that juries should consider the effect 
of mental illness on a defendant in deciding whether a murder was 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty,126 The court reasoned 
that a jury's verdict 
will more accurately reflect the community's conscience, goals, 
and norms, if the jurors are not arbitrarily restricted to consider­
ing only the defendant's course of action, but are also permitted 
to consider the defendant's peculiar mental state as an additional 
factor to be weighed in determining whether the murder was 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 127 
This decision to consider a defendant's mental condition was, 
again, based on "logical relevance. "128 "Surely, if a malicious mind 
123. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1269,405 N.E.2d at 936 (Quirico, J., concurring in 
part & dissenting in part). 
124. The change in the law of deliberately premeditated murder would be a 
jury instntction "in accordance with" the instruction found in Commonwealth v. 
Delle Chiaie, 323 Mass. 615, 84 N.E.2d 7 (1949). Commonwealth v. Gould, 1980 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1264,405 N.E.2d at 933. The instntction in Delle Chiaie related to 
the issue of the intoxication but it is easily adapted to the issue of mental illness: 
[oln the question of murder in the first degree deliberately premeditated ... 
if you are satisfied upon the evidence that the defendant killed the deceased 
but that he was incapable of conceiving a deliberately premeditated inten­
tion to kill because of intoxication, then he is not guilty of murder in the 
first degree, but he is guilty of murder in the second degree. That is because 
deliberate premeditation is required there, and if a man is so overcome by 
liquor that he is incapable of deliberately premeditating, then the law says, 
out of kindness to him in that situation, that he is not guilty of murder in the 
first degree but he is guilty of murder in the second degree. 
323 Mass. at 617-18,84 N.E.2d at 8-9. 
125. See note 106 supra and accompanying text. 
126. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1267,405 N.E.2d at 934-35. 
127. Id. at 1266,405 N.E.2d at 934 (footnote omitted). 
128. United States v. Bethea, 365, A.2d at 85. See notes 112-16 supra and ac­
companying text for an explanation of Bethea's "logical relevance" theory. 
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may be considered as evidence that a defendant committed a mur­
der with extreme atrocity or cruelty, then fairness requires that an 
impaired mind may also be considered as evidence bearing on 
whether or not the defendant committed the murder with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty. "129 
This decision in effect reads a specific intent element into the 
crime: if specific intent were not present, a defendant's mental im­
pairment would be irrelevant to the issue of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty130 since the crime otherwise requires only general in­
tent. 131 To hold that juries may consider mental capacity, yet to 
maintain that there is no specific intent element to murder by ex­
treme atrocity or cruelty, gives the consideration of mental impair­
ment the same effect as a total insanity defense. It assumes this 
quality because mental impairment, if found to have affected the 
defendant's conduct, could only relate to the negation of general 
criminal intent, thus rendering the defendant criminally irresponsi­
ble. The Gould court, however, did not hold that mental impair­
ment should render the defendant criminally irresponsible; rather, 
it held that the defendant should be held responsible to a lesser 
degree. Since Comnwnwealth v. Cooper132 previously established 
that irresponsibility cannot reduce the degree of crime, the only 
logical explanation for reducing the degree of conviction must be 
defendant's lack of specific intent to torture or mutilate. Thus, if 
Cooper is still good law, and it can be argued that it is,133 the ad­
dition of a specific intent element into murder with extreme atroc­
ity or cruelty is an inescapable implication of Gould. The addition 
129. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265,405 N.E.2d at 934. 
130. The Gould court stated that a "defendant's peculiar mental state" is to be 
considered by a jury in determining -.yhether a murder has been committed with ex­
treme atrocity or cruelty. [d. at 1266, 405 N.E.2d at 934. 
131. See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the ele­
ments of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
132. 219 Mass. at 1, 106 N.E. at 545, which is discussed in notes 39-41 supra 
and accompanying text. 
133. The court in Gould asserts that it is not adopting the doctrine of dimin­
ished capacity. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1262,405 N.E.2d at 932. This assertion is con­
sistent with the holding of Cooper, which is discussed in notes 39-41 supra and ac­
companying text. In its discussion of the deliberate premeditation issue, the court 
further stated it had merely applied the" ·ordinary rules of law' " in relation to the 
mens rea necessary for conviction of a particular crime. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1261, 
405 N.E.2d at 932. This statement is also consistent with the Cooper holding, for 
Cooper applies only to a finding of irresponsibility and not to a lack of specific in­
tenl. Finally, the court in Gould did not expressly overrule Cooper as it did overrule 
other cases. [d. at 1263,405 N.E.2d at 933. 
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of a specific intent element, however, clearly contradicts estab­
lished theory and necessarily invalidates a mass of legal prece­
dent. 134 It would appear, then, that this decision is indeed an "at­
tempt to rewrite a legislative definition of what constitutes one of 
the three types of murder in the first degree. "135 
The supreme judicial court now has three avenues of interpre­
tation open to it when Gould is applied to future cases involving 
murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty. First, the court could ig­
nore its own statement denying adoption of diminished capacity 
and openly apply the doctrine with full knowledge of its effect on 
prior Massachusetts case law. 13G Second, the court could apply the 
doctrine while denying its- use, as it did in Gould. This technique 
allows the court to limit decisions to the facts of the particular case 
should the doctrine or its surreptitious use prove to be un­
workable. 137 Finally, the court simply could embrace its denial, re­
pudiate the doctrine, and attempt to reconcile Gould with prior 
case law. Because of the possibility that the court might take one of 
the latter two avenues, particularly the latter, Gould may have a 
secondary impact on the Massachusetts law of murder with ex­
treme atrocity or cruelty. If the court chooses not to apply dimin­
ished capacity outright, the court will then have to reconcile Gould 
with previously established precedent. 
If the court is sincere in its rejection of diminished capacity, 
then allowing consideration of defendant's mental impairment 
when he is charged with murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty 
might be justifiable. The court could have weighed the traditional 
134. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Podlaski, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 427, 385 N.E.2d 
1379; Commonwealth v. Monsen, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 309, 385 N .E.2d 984; Com­
monwealth v. Lacy, 371 Mass. 363, 358 N.E.2d 419 (1976); Commonwealth v. 
Appleby, 358 Mass. 407, 265 N.E.2d 485 (1970) (cases which hold that there is no 
specific intent element to murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty). 
135. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1273, 405 N .E.2d at 938 (Quirico, J., concurring in 
part & dissenting in part). 
136. See notes 91-135 supra and accompanying text for an analysis of the im­
pact on Massachusetts law of the adoption of the doctrine of diminished capacity. 
137. Justice Quirico stated that the majority decision 
opens the door for any defendant to escape the legislative mandate of a life 
sentence without benefit of parole for the crime of murder committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty by his resort to the simple device of raising a rea­
sonable doubt whether he acted under the influence of drugs or intoxicating 
liquor in committing an alleged brutal or savage murder. Cr., .e.g., Common­
wealth v. Podlaski . ... 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1273,405 N.E.2d at 938 (Qui rico, J., concurring in part & dis­
senting in part). 
603 1981] FIRST DEGREE MURDER 
factor138 of the accused's indifference to his victim's suffering more 
heavily than the other factors associated with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty to make it determinative of the issue. 139 The court in fact 
did stress the defendant's indifference. to his victim's pain in its 
"logical relevance"14o argument. 141 Furthermore, when the addi­
tion of specific intent is discounted, the new jury instruction that 
an impaired mind may be considered in determining extreme 
atrocity or cruelty142 can only relate to a defendant's indifference to 
the victim's suffering since that is the only traditional factor that fo­
cuses subjectively upon the defendant. 143 All other traditional fac­
tors focus objectively upon the defendant's actions,144 or they focus 
upon the victim both objectively and subjectively.145 
Weighing one factor more heavily than the others, however, is 
contrary to the established method of determining the issue of ex­
treme atrocity or cruelty. Normally, no single element can prove 
atrocity or cruelty. As stated in Comrrwnwealth v. Podlaski,146 
"The importance of a particular factor bearing on the possibility of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty varies from case to case" and where a 
particular factor is absent the prosecution has to "prove its case by 
relying on other factors. "147 Furthermore, the model jury instruc­
tion proposed by the court oddly omits the defendant's indifference 
to his victim's suffering from its list of "traditional factors" to be 
considered. 148 Therefore, should the court continue to deny adop­
tion of diminished capacity, it is not likely that Gould will be inter­
preted to mean that the factor of the defendant's indifference to his 
victim's suffering should be weighed more heavily than the other 
traditional factors of extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
138. For a list of the traditional factors of murder with extreme atrocity or cru­
elty, see note 71 supra and accompanying text. 
139. For example, if the defendant is found to be indifferent to his victim's suf­
fering, the jury should consider whether that indifference was overborne by the de­
fendant's mental impairment. 
140. See 365 A.2d at 85, which is discussed in notes 107-10 supra and accompa­
nying text. 
141. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265, 405 N.E.2d at 934. 
142. The text of the proposed jury instruction is stated in note 76 supra. 
143. A subjective inquiry makes the defendant's state of mind relevant to the 
consideration of extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
144. See note 71 supra and accompanying text for the list of traditional factors. 
An objective inquiry would render the defendant's state of mind irrelevant. 
145. Objective factors relating to the victim are "consciousness" and "extent of 
physical injury," while the subjective factor is the victim's degree of suffering. 
146.' 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 427, 385 N .E.2d 1379 (1979). 
147. Id. at 439,385 N.E.2d at 1386. 
148. See note 76 supra for the text of the proposed jury instruction. 
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The more probable interpretation of Gould is that the su­
preme judicial court is defining an entirely new defense that re­
duces criminal culpability by reason of mental impairment for the 
crime of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty, even in the ab­
sence of a specific intent element. Since the court did not attempt 
to refute the premise that there is no specific intent element to the 
crime,149 a finding of severe mental impairment should exonerate 
the defendant because such a finding should work under the 
McHoul test to negate general criminal intent, thus rendering de­
fendant unaccountable for his criminal actions. 1SO The court held, 
however, that a finding of severe mental impairment would only 
reduce the degree of conviction. 151 In the absence of the addition 
of specific intent, the language of the opinion implies that the new 
mental impairment defense affects only the degree of murder of 
which the defendant should, in all fairness, be convicted. 1s2 
149. The supreme judicial court may be said to agree impliedly that there is no 
specific intent element for two reasons. First, it cites as support Commonwealth v. 
Gilbert, 165 Mass. at 4S, 42 N.E. at 336, which flatly rejects the idea that murder 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty has a specific intent element. See the discussion of 
Gilbert in notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text. The court's reliance on Gilbert 
becomes even more significant when considered in conjunction with the court's 
readiness in Gould to overrule precedent with which it now disagrees. See 1980. 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1263, 40S N.E.2d at 933; notes 64-109 supra and accompanying 
text. 
Second, the court's rationale on the extreme atrocity or cruelty issue does not 
seem to focus upon whether Gould had a specific intent to cause suffering, but 
rather upon whether his mental impairment affected the means by which he chose to 
inflict death. The distinction may be fine, but the implication that there is no spe­
cific intent element also arises in the proposed jury instruction which focuses on ob­
jective factors, and not on subjective intent. The proposed jury instruction appears in 
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1267 ri.16, 40S N.E.2d at 93S n.16. If this instruction is used 
upon retrial and it is found that the defendant's choice of means had been affected, 
the court will determine that the murder was not committed with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty. The degree of conviction thus will drop to murder in the second degree, re­
gardless of how shocking or brutal the deed may have been. 
Since the majority analysis does not specifically rely on the negation of spe­
cific intent, it can be argued that there is still no specific intent element for the 
crime of murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty, even in light of the decision to re­
mand in Gould. 
ISO. See notes SO-S6 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
McHoul test. 
lSI. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1264-67, 40S N.E.2d at 933-3S. 
lS2. Throughout this section of the opinion the court used language such as 
"fairness requires that an impaired mind may also be considered ...." [d. at 126S, 
40S N.E.2d at 934. Consideration of mental impairment "is essential if the jury is to 
serve fully and fairly as the community's conscience ...." [d. at 1267, 40S N.E.2d at 
93S. Thus, the underlying theme is based on a standard of fairness in the conviction 
of a mentally impaired defendant. 
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This interpretation is bolstered by the court's statement that 
mental impairment is directly related to the issue of degree of 
murder and indirectly related to the issue of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.153 Thus the supreme judicial court seems to be fashioning 
a new kind of partial defense based on insanity that will work as 
follows: if a defendant proves substantial mental impairment that 
would preclude a conviction of murder in the first degree by delib­
erate premeditation, he may not be convicted of first degree mur­
der by means of extreme atrocity or cruelty if, in all fairness, the 
circumstances of the case warrant only a second degree convic­
tion. 154 
By focusing on the ambiguous standard of fairness of the de­
gree of conviction rather than on the intent of the defendant, the 
court avoided adding a specific intent element to murder by ex­
treme atrocity or cruelty yet still achieved the desired result of 
insulating mentally handicapped defendants from first degree con­
victions. This, indeed, may be what the court intended to accom­
plish by its denial of the adoption of diminished capacity .155 
153. The court stated, "Impairment of a defendant's ability to make a decision 
in a normal manner may have a direct bearing on the degree of murder, and conse­
quently, on the issues of extreme atrocity or cruelty." Id. at 1266-67, 405 N.E.2d at 
935 (emphasis added). Thus, the focus may be on the reduction of the degree of con­
viction rather than on the defendant's inability to form a newly added specific intent 
element. 
154. For example, assume that Dennis Gould, instead of believing himself to 
be the new Messiah, thought that he was a member of the Spanish Inquisition. As­
sume further that as part of his "holy mission" from God he lured his victim to his 
home in order to make her renounce her sins and to save her soul. To carry out his 
mission he used such unpleasant persuasion techniques as the "rack," "thumb­
screws," and the "iron maiden," which resulted in his victim's death. The totality of 
these circumstances, including all the evidence of Gould's long-standing history of 
religious delusions, in all fairness, would continue to warrant only a conviction in 
the second degree even though the manner the defendant chose to inflict death was 
unduly painful and shocking because his belief that he was acting on, orders of God 
affected his choice of means. 
155. Some support for this proposition may be found in Commonwealth v. 
Cadwell, 374 Mass. 308, 372 N.E.2d 246 (1978), i~ which the court, after considering 
both objective and subjective factors as well as the effect of those factors on the de­
fendant's state of mind, stated that the lesser conviction of murder in the second de­
gree was warranted. See also Comment, supra note 41, at 812. Furthermore, the 
guidelines enunciated for future jury instructions focus more upon "course of action" 
than upon "peculiar mental state" because the instruction weighs the defendant's 
mental impairment in the evaluation of manner, means, 'method, disproportion of 
means used to inflict death, and degree of the victim's suffering. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1267 n.16, 405 N.E.2d at 935 n.16. See note 149 supra for a discussion of the pro­
posed jury instruction. Such an evaluation does not appear to be subjective, specific 
intent evaluation but rather an objective, general intent evaluation of the "factors 
customarily associated with extreme atrocity or cruelty." Id. 
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Unfortunately, the language of the opinion dealing with ex­
treme atrocity or cruelty is not sufficiently explicit to make this 
proposition the most logical inference arising from the holding. The 
first inference that can be drawn from the opinion is that the doc­
trine of diminished capacity, expressly rejected by the court, was 
actually applied to the crime of murder with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty. Such application is tantamount to adding a specific intent 
element to that crime. 
Whether the supreme judicial court applied the doctrine of di­
minished capacity to the crime of murder with extreme atrocity or 
cruelty or whether the court was fashioning a new mental impair­
ment defense based on fairness, the result is the same for the de­
fendant: his conviction is reduced from first to second degree mur­
der. In either of these events, Gould represents a major change in 
Massachusetts law. Prior to Gould, when a murder was committed 
with extremely cruel or atrocious means, McHoul would have al­
lowed a verdict of either not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty 
of first degree murder. A lesser verdict of guilty would have been 
impermissible. 156 Thus, it is evident that no matter what avenue157 
the court takes in the future in interpreting Gould, this decision 
flatly rejects the basic premise of McHoul that insanity is an all-or­
nothing defense. 
It appears from the language of the opinion that the supreme 
judicial court has adopted the doctrine of diminished capacity and 
has applied that doctrine to the crime of murder with extreme 
atrocity or cruelty. The application of a doctrine which is premised 
upon the negation of specific intent necessarily implies that the 
crime contains a specific intent element. Thus, the decision either 
will have to be clarified or will come to stand for the proposition 
that there is a specific intent element to the crime of murder with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty. This is a necessary result of the court's 
focus upon mental impairment since the use of impairment to re­
duce the degree of conviction under the doctrine of diminished ca­
pacity can be relevant only to the issue of specific intent. 
Should future clarification of the decision repudiate application 
of the doctrine and the addition of specific intent, however, the de­
cision would appear to be creating a new partial insanity defense 
based upon the fairness of the degree of conviction in light of the 
totality of the circumstances of the case. 
156. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of McHoul. 
157. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the 
three avenues open to the court in interpreting Gould in the future. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
In Comrrwnwealth v. Gould,158 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court adopted a liberal approach to the doctrine of dimin­
ished capacity that applies that doctrine to all crimes involving spe­
cific intent. Although the court expressly denied taking such ac­
tion, its denial must be ignored for many reasons. First, the jury 
instruction suggested by the court as to the issue of deliberate pre­
meditation159 is a classic example of the doctrine. The instruction 
informs the jury that if it is found that the defendant killed the vic­
tim, but that he was incapable of deliberately premeditating be­
cause of his mental impairment, the defendant is guilty of second 
degree murder.160 The court also overruled a line of Massachusetts 
cases that had expressly rejected the doctrine of diminished capac­
ity161 and instead relied upon decisions handed down in other ju­
risdictions which have adopted the doctrine. 162 Furthermore, the 
court in effect rejected the McHoul premise that insanity is an all­
or-nothing defense163 by holding that a finding of mental impair­
ment does not exonerate a defendant but instead may reduce his 
conviction from first to second degree murder. 
The supreme judicial court took an indirect approach toward 
mitigating the plight of mentally handicapped defendants by ap­
plying the doctrine of diminished capacity while denying its use. If 
the court is going to use diminished capacity, it should acknowl­
edge that the doctrine is viable and avoid confusing the courts be­
low as to the precise extent of the doctrine. Perhaps the supreme 
judicial court's denial was an attempt to limit application of the 
doctrine to cases involving a defendant with a longstanding history 
of severe mental illness. But if this is so, the decision's impact on 
the essential elements of the crime of murder with extreme atroc­
ity or cruelty is further confused: the court's apparent application 
of diminished capacity to murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty 
implies the addition of a specific intent element into that crime. 
IS8. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 12S3, 40S N.E.2d at 927. 
IS9. See note 124 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the jury in­
struction which should be "in accordance with Commonwealth v. Delle Chiaie." Id. 
at 1264, 40S N.E.2d at 933. 
160. Id. at 1261, 40S N.E.2d at 932. 
161. Id. at 1263, 40S N.E.2d at 933. 
162. Id. at 1262 & n.13, 1263, 40S N.E.2d 932 & n.13. See notes 104-106 supra 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's reliance on United States v. 
Brawner, 471 F.2d at 969. 
163. See notes SO-S2 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of McHoul. 
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The court, however, maintains that it has not added such a 
specific intent element and cites as supporting precedent Massa­
chusetts cases interpreting that crime as having no specific intent 
requirement. 164 Therefore, should the court explain this decision 
further in the future, a new defense of reduced culpability by rea­
son of insanity may be created that focuses not on specific intent 
but on the fairness of convicting a mentally impaired defendant of 
first degree murder under the totality of the circumstances. 16S 
James J. Pancotti 
164. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1265-67, 405 N.E.2d at 934-35; see note 149 supra 
for an argument in support of this assertion by the court. 
165. See notes 149-55 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the "fair­
ness" defense. ' 
